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3INTRODUCTION
In the current times of multifaceted crisis, nationalism looks, more than ever, like a
positive and necessary feeling. It seems both natural and indispensable if we are to
have viable political and social institutions that meet the needs and preferences of
all citizens.
The following paper contests this vision. Its criticism of nationalism is directed not
only at its national forms, but also at any defence of collective identity based on the
same model, such as the various forms of European nationalism. Furthermore, the
same overriding criticism can be made of different kinds of nationalism, regardless
of their more or less open and progressive political content. In order to ground our
argument theoretically and practically, we will try to show that nationalism is always
potentially harmful to individual rights, and unnecessary for the maintenance of a
just social and political system.
We will thus oppose any acritical defence of the intrinsic value of a specific commu-
nity and the belief in its artificial homogeneity. The historical construction of a
supposedly homogeneous community, and the insistence on its values, which are
perceived as superior and binding, facilitate the absorption of the individual into the
collective. As we will explain further in more details, this holistic approach is typical
of communitarian approaches. In that respect, it does not really matter whether they
appeal to passion or to reason, to some irrational binding features of the community
or to more rational political aspects of a common identity. The main problem in
nationalism is not the emotion it can trigger, it is not even its reliance on particular
values. What makes nationalism problematic is, firstly, that it tends to overlook the
intrinsically divisive and contradictory nature of individual and collective interests in
unjust societies; secondly, that it attributes an intrinsic superiority to a particular
community over others; and thirdly, that it sees politics as a means to promote the
interests, values or identity of that community.
As an alternative, we will very briefly advocate a cosmopolitan approach that
grounds political legitimacy in a demanding approach to individual freedom, rather
than in a shared collective identity. However, even if only briefly, we will also
carefully distinguish our own vision of cosmopolitanism from those commonly put
forward. Frequently, cosmopolitan perspectives entangle their identity frameworks
with concrete political projects, without clearly explaining how the latter derive from
the former. Our approach to cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is, first and
foremost, a critical vision of all communitarian postulates according to which politics
should be based on some form of collective identity. Thus, we insist on the concep-
tual distinction between a general stance on identity issues and the more practical
political ideology one stands for. In a subsequent step, we link this cosmopolitan
framework with a progressive approach to individual rights. Because of our
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demanding approach to individual freedom, our cosmopolitanism goes hand in hand
with a revival of identity-free sovereignty. It is therefore distinct from the severe
condemnation of sovereignty often found in most mainstream cosmopolitan
positions. Finally, instead of the frequent confusion found in public discourses and in
the literature between ideals and reality, our position acknowledges the deep gulf
separating these two dimensions. It therefore sketches out very general strategic
principles to bring normative ideals closer to political reality.
Sophie Heine1
1 Dr in Politics and Senior Research Fellow at Egmont, Royal Institute for International Relations.
51. NATIONALISM: A POTENTIALLY HARMFUL 
DOCTRINE
1.1. A modern construction
It might first of all be useful to recall that nations, national identities and nationalism
are the product of a long historical and artificial process of construction. Here we will
therefore adopt the “modernist” approach to nationalism, as opposed to the
“primordialist” and “ethnosymbolic” ones.
For a long time, the prevailing view on nationalism among scholars was influenced by
primordialist premises, according to which nationalism was a natural and universal
feature of human societies2. On the contrary, modernists stressed the specifically
modern and constructed character of nations and nationalism. As for the ethnosym-
bolists, they were born as a reaction to the modernists and emphasized the role of
myths, symbols, memories, values and traditions in the formation, persistence and
change of ethnicity and nationalism. They explored the way earlier ethnic communi-
ties paved the way for the emergence of nationalism and insisted on the continuities
between them3. They studied the way “ethnies” came into being and became
durable phenomena, by insisting on objective as well as on subjective elements.
Modernists, on the contrary, believe that nations and nationalism are contingent,
modern and socially constructed phenomena and that nationalism is explicitly polit-
ical. For this school of thought, the nationalist doctrine can be defined in the
following way: first of all, a nation exists, characterized by an explicit and peculiar
character; secondly, the interests and values of this nation have priority over other
interests and values; and finally, the nation must be as independent as possible and
this requires political sovereignty4. For Ernest Gellner, nationalism is a political
principle in which the political and the national units should be congruent5.
Hobsbawm, another renown modernist scholar, described nations and nationalism
as being the products of “social engineering”. Nations and nationalism would not
exist without what he famously labeled “invented traditions”6: “a set of ritual or
symbolic practices which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by
repetition”. These invented traditions and their constant repetition imply a strong
continuity with the past. But this continuity is artificiallybuilt: history is used as a tool
to legitimize political action and as a cement for group cohesion. Particularly during
the period between 1870 and 1914 in Europe, building such traditions was the main
2 Pierre L. Van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon, Elsevier, New York, 1981.
3 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, Routledge, Abingdon, 1998.
4 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993 (2d Edition).
5 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2009 (1st Ed. 1983).
6 Eric Hobsbauwm, The Invention of Tradition, 1983; Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth,
Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012 (2d Edition).
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strategy used by elites to counter the threat of mass democracy by consolidating a
common identity. Primary education, public ceremonies and monuments were used
to make nationalism a new secular religion. This process also means that it is states
and nationalism which have created nations and not the other way around.
According to the modernist analysis, this construction was possible only in the
modern period because of its technological and economic evolutions. For instance, a
progress such as printing allowed the constitution of national languages, mass
literacy and mass schooling. Nationalism offered a double answer to this new
context. First, a political answer, as the idea of citizenship allowed a definition of
individuals as members of a common polity of citizens; and secondly, a cultural
answer: the elites started stressing the common identity of that polity in order to
legitimize state action and secure the support of the masses. In other words, nation-
alism’s birth and persistence can be explained by the interests it fulfils. In other
words, ethnic and national identities are useful tools for political elites to trigger
mass support in the battle for wealth, power and prestige7. This instrumental
approach highlights the politicization of ethnic and cultural identities to explain their
transformation into nationalism. This politicization, as well as the political and
economic environment it takes place in, can also explain how cultural differences can
be turned into ethnic conflicts. But there is no automaticity in that transformation,
which also makes it potentially reversible.
1.2. Fictive homogeneity and superiority
Nations and nationalism are thus social and cultural artifacts. Such a construction
tends to hide the numerous social and cultural divides and hybrid mixtures charac-
terizing the collective in question. The nation can be described as “an imagined polit-
ical community”, in which the members do not know one another but share a
common image of the nation8. “Imagined” does not imply “falsity”: although they are
mainly cultural and symbolic realities, nations are nonetheless realities. Nationalism
conveys the idea that nations are horizontal comradeships, regardless of all the
inequalities pervading them. This sense of fraternity is what makes it possible for the
members of the nation to die for them.
This fictitious homogeneity is doubly problematic. First, it dissimulates the internal
social and, in particular, class-based contradictions within society, thereby
preventing dominated social groups from grasping the reality that their interests are
fundamentally opposed to those of the dominants, and, in reality, come close to
those of the social majorities of other communities. This constructed national
7 Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Theory and Comparison, Sage Publication, London, 1991.
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso
Books, London 2016 (1st Ed: 1983).
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identity constitutes, therefore, a useful tool for the elites to prevent social revolt:
instead of fighting for more democracy and a better distribution of the collective
wealth, citizens trust “their” rulers, perceived as the incarnation of the general
interest of the whole nation9.
The assumption of a common identity grounded in specific and positive values also
facilitates the assertion of a cultural superiority over other collectives. It is all the
more dangerous when a national identity is linked to particular political institutions,
which is the case in most forms of nationalism. Indeed, as shown by social
psychology, valuing a particular identity often goes hand in hand with the devaluing
of other communities, and generates a division between apparently cohesive “us”
and “them”10. Yet the danger is that, once discredited, a group of people can
become the subject of all possible exclusions or oppressions. When this group lives
within the same territory as the dominant community, it can be symbolically
isolated through this process, and be attributed responsibility for many social
problems. For example, people of Muslim origin, even when they possess a
European citizenship and have been living in Europe since their birth, are perceived
as foreign, and as responsible for various problems, such as insecurity or
terrorism11. Through this process, a discursive homogenization takes place that
erases the tensions inside the group concerned: foreign “communities” seem
cohesive and harmonious, paralleling the artificial homogeneity of the main cultural
group, but they are actually split by similar internal contradictions – social, ethnic or
gender-related for instance.
Worse still, this artificial cultural separation overshadows the potential common
values or interests transcending cultural communities. Times of social difficulty can
consequently be used by populist movements to divert attention from more relevant
political issues towards nationalistic or, more broadly, communitarian topics. For
instance, “foreigners” will be designated as “those who steal our jobs and profit from
our social system”. This discourse justifies anti-immigration policies, which, far from
solving the real causes of unemployment and decreasing solidarity in welfare,
9 In an interesting passage in his analysis of the Irish question, Karl Marx noted that British nationalism guar-
anteed to the British bourgeoisie and aristocracy the support of the British working class. It created the idea
of a common identity and generated resentment within the popular classes against the Irish proletarians,
seen as competitors rather than as objective allies: “In all the industrial and commercial centers in England
the working class is divided in two hostile camps, the Irish and British proletarians. The ordinary English
worker hates the Irish worker who he sees as a competitor decreasing his level of wealth. Against the Irish
worker, he feels part of the dominant nation and thereby becomes an instrument for the aristocrats and the
capitalists against Ireland, strengthening at the same time their domination on himself”. Karl Marx and Frie-
drich Engels, Selected Correspondence, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, pp. 236-237.
10 Henri Tajfel, “Social Psychology of Intergoup Relations”, Annual Review of Psychology, 33, 1982; John C.
Turner, “Social Comparison, Similarity, In-goup Favoritism”, in Henri Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between
Social Groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations (Academic Press: London, 1978);
Maria Sanchez-Manza, “La citoyenneté européenne et l’Autre du dedans”, in, Maria Sanchez-Manza and
Laurent Licata (Ed.), L’Autre. Regards psychosociaux, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, Grenoble, 2005.
11 See for ex. The Annual Report 2014 of the Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France: http://www.islamo-
phobie.net/sites/default/files/CCIF-Annual-Report-2014.pdf.
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permit, on the contrary, the maintenance of a “reserve army” of illegal immigrants,
exerting a downwards pressure on the wages of low skilled labor. More importantly,
this discourse hides the important proximity of interests in a legal job, a better salary,
and better access for all to social benefits that is shared by workers and citizens from
all origins. The valuing of national identity can also lead to the devaluing of external
communities. As a result, nationalist discourses are often accompanied by the
construction of outside enemies, usually regardless of any objective threat. When it
is used to justify wars, nationalism then takes on its most anti-humanistic and anti-
liberal visage: it manages to convince the members of the “national community” to
give their blood for it12. Nationalism can also justify policies privileging “our” interest
over that of other populations. Economic and political elites will for instance defend
“our” enterprises’ competitiveness against those of other countries, either in Europe
or in the world. Such rhetoric is not only particularistic, but also obscures the reality:
in many fields, the race for greater competitiveness pits workers all over the world
against each other rather than pitting nations against each other. Let us note that this
competition is particularly fierce within the eurozone and that the (short term)
winners of this economic battle are usually transnational corporations rather than
particular nations. Indeed, the emphasis on national competitiveness is misleading.
Contrary to the illusion that it promotes common national interests, it actually
enables a great deal of social regressions: boosting competitiveness often means
reducing the cost of labour and increasing its flexibility, as well as lowering taxes on
capital income and benefits13.
1.3. Similar dangers at the European level
Euronationalism would pose the same dangers as the classical forms of nationalism.
Even explicitly democratic and progressive forms of “constitutional patriotism” (CP),
such as that promoted by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas for a long time,
present many similarities with national forms of nationalism, despite their conscious
effort to go beyond it14. To be sure, CP aims to tame national identities, by
highlighting their very particularistic and harmful effects on individual liberties, and
also by insisting on a constant and critical evaluation of each national history
according to universalistic criteria of human rights and democracy. CP is presented
by its supporters as a new form of belonging grounded in attachment to universal
principles, human rights and democracy, rather than in particular cultural values, as
12 George Kateb, “Is Patriotism a mistake?”, Social Research, 67 (4), Winter 2000, pp. 906-907.
13 Tax competition is particularly important within the eurozone and has a differential impact on small and big
countries: Inga Rademacher, “Tax competition within the Eurozone: Capital mobility, Agglomeration,
Compensation and the Small Country Disadvantage”, MPIfG Discussion Paper 13, 2013, http://www.mpi-fg-
koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp13-13.pdf.
14 Justine Lacroix, “Europe et libéralisme politique. Sens d’un postnationalisme ‘radical’”, Politique
Européenne, September 2006, 19, pp. 30-31; Sophie Heine, “Jürgen Habermas et le patriotisme constitu-
tionnel”, Politique, Revue de débat, September-October 2011, N°71.
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well as on a reflexive perception of history15. Nonetheless, the same mechanisms as
those prevailing in traditional forms of nationalism are at play in this supposedly
distinct form of belonging. Both approaches rely on the conviction that a specific
community exists – in the case of CP, the European community – and that it contains
positive and historically-anchored values different from other communities. These
values are not only positive, but also discrete, and, moreover, superior to those of
other cultural entities. This is illustrated by a profound pride in the supposed historic
achievements of the moral community of reference, and by the desire to defend its
interests internationally16. Despite an explicit will to break with nationalism, the
defenders of European CP insist, in the same way as do traditional nationalists, on an
emotional collective identity as a precondition for the functioning of any political
entity17. The insistence on a common identity grounded in particular values and a
specific history is also very present in these arguments18. The same dangers as those
identified before for nationalism can thus also be associated to euronationalism.
Consequently, the real conceptual tension in the debate on the reconfiguration of
national identity does not actually oppose anti-European “nationalists” and pro-
European “post-nationalists”. Rather, the real disagreement seems to be between
those who agree that there must be a congruence between the legal community and
the moral (or cultural) community in order for there to be a politically viable entity
and those who want to detach the distinctive identities from legal and political insti-
tutions, arguing that they should be based on universal principles rather than on
specific values.
In political debates on Europe too, most contenders share broadly communitarian
premises without even being aware of it. Thus, the majority of eurosceptics do not
oppose the current EU only for social, political or strategic reasons. Most of them
also promote a particular vision of identity which is at odds with the European idea:
they often share the postulate according to which just institutions need a common
identity, in this case, a national one. This communitarian framework is most obvious
in right-wing eurosceptic discourses which have a clear identity basis and see nation-
alism as their defining doctrine. The picture is a bit more complex in the case of left-
wing eurosceptic discourses: here, the main ideologies are critical of the excessive
economic liberalism characterizing the EU as well as its “democratic deficit”. Such a
criticism is shared by various tendencies within the left, from the most radical to the
most moderate ones. The difference between them is their degree of radicalism and
15 Jürgen Habermas, L’intégration républicaine, Fayard, Paris, 1998, pp. 177-179 et p. 12-13; Jürgen
Habermas, The postnational Constelleation: Political Essays, MIT Press Edition, Cambridge, Massachussets,
2001).
16 See in particular: Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “Europe: plaidoyer pour une politique extérieure
commune”, Libération, 31May – 1st June 2003.
17 Jürgen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay, Surhkamp, Berlin, 2014, p. 90.
18 On this, see also Philippe Juvin, Notre Histoire, Les cent dates qui ont fait la nation européenne, J.C. Lattès,
Paris, 2014.
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the strategic conclusions they draw. The radical left seems to consider that projects
trying to redirect the EU in a more social and democratic direction are doomed. Let
us note that there was certainly more optimism in earlier periods. For instance, the
left opposed to the European Constitutional Treaty combined a radical criticism of
the current EU with a project for an alternative – more social and democratic –
Europe19. This does not mean that the eurosceptic left was deprived of national
sentiment but that it could complement it with an explicitly “alter-European” vision.
The return to a more national strategy by the critical left in most Western European
countries can be explained by the relative disenchantment now prevailing in those
circles. The recent treaties and policy orientations have indeed not weakened the
economic liberalism and oligarchic tendencies characterizing the EU at least since the
1980s. Patriotic or nationalist tendencies can then find some room for expression,
even within left-wing forms of euroscepticism, thereby confirming an old tradition
on the left. Indeed, in the course of the twentieth entury, the European reformist left
has ended up associating the welfare state and democratic sovereignty with national
identity. This current national orientation was recently confirmed by the alliance
formed between the radical left Syriza and the right-wing sovereignist “Independent
Greeks” in Greece20.
At the other end of the polemic, “federalist” movements often share a similar view
on the link between politics and identity: their arguments in favour of a deeper
European integration usually mix social, economic and political reasons with identity-
related ones. One often hears from them, not only that a common European identity
is indispensable to reach better “output” and “input” legitimacy21 of the EU, but also
that the latter will increase the former. There is therefore a circular reinforcement of
the political and identity dimension: a common European identity will secure a
common political integration (in the broad sense and therefore also including social
and economic aspects) and this political integration will strengthen the common
identity. One therefore gets slightly consufed about the real objective: a common
identity or more political integration? In any case, the thought and discursive
processes are very similar in most eurosceptic and federalist approaches, at least
concerning the links established between politics and identity. They might differ on
the level at which they aim to rehabilite sovereignty (national or European) but they
often share a similar approach to the links between identity and politics. As I will
argue further, the real contrast is between communitarian views, in the broad sense,
19 Sophie Heine, Europhobic or Eurocritical? Opposition to the European Union in the French and German Left,
LAP, 2010.
20 Sophie Heine, “Syriza’s call for sovereignty: Hopes and Illusions”, Egmont, Commentary, http://
www.egmontinstitute.be/publication_article/syrizas-call-for-sovereignty-hopes-and-illusions/, 29-01-2015.
21 “Input” legitimacy refers to the more or less democratic dimension of the decision-making process, while
“output” legitimacy refers to the policies delivered by the institutions:  Fritz Scharpf, “Problem-Solving
Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU”, MPIfG Working Paper 03/1, February 2003.
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and cosmopolitan approaches – the former encompassing at once nationalists and
euro-nationalists22.
1.4. “Good” versus “bad” nationalism?
Many supporters of a progressive version of nationalism – in this case, often labeled
as “patriotism” – argue that if nationalism can be pernicious because of its narrow
and exclusive cultural values, it is worth embracing a “good” version of it, grounded
in universal and political principles. This distinction between a good form of
patriotism and a more dangerous nationalism is, however, deceptive. In practice,
they usually come very close to one another. It is certainly true that they can differ
in their intensity and in the policies associated with them. In that respect, it might be
useful to recall that nationalism is a general doctrine supposing a particular relation-
ship to national identity rather than a fully-fledged political ideology. In concrete
political discourses, it is usually associated with particular political ideologies, such as
liberalism, conservatism or socialism23. To take just a few examples, the patriotic
approach put forward by the left-wing party Syriza is tied to very left-wing social
policies. In a similar vein, there is a case for approaching differently the nationalistic
reactions of certain populations which have undergone economic, social and cultural
domination. For some modernist authors, nationalism has to be located in the
“uneven development” of history: nationalism developed in poor countries on the
“periphery” as a reaction against external domination and invasion by more
powerful countries24. In that context, nationalism allowed the construction of an
inter-class community which was strongly aware of its own separate identity vis-à-vis
the external forces of domination. However, even explicitly progressive or more
morally justified forms of nationalism can culminate in the same drift towards
narrower and more exclusivist approaches. The fact that the seeds of progress and
regress can be found in all types of nationalism makes it an inherently ambiguous
phenomenon possibly leading to diverse and conflicting political or moral conse-
quences. Therefore, even if it could somehow make sense to distinguish a dominant
nationalism and a dominated one25, as well as one fed by a social minority and linked
to conservative policies and another one enjoying a broader social legitimacy and
22 For a detailed explanation of these different philosophical schools, see: Sophie Heine, “National vs postna-
tional ou communautarisme vs cosmopolitisme? Une confrontation des différentes approches théoriques
sur l’identité”, in John-Erik Fossum, Paul Magnette, Johanne Poirier, Ces liens qui unissent: accommoder la
diversité en Europe et au Canada / Ties that Bind: Accomodating Diversity in Europe and Canada, Peter
Lang, Bruxelles, 2009; See also the second chapter of Sophie Heine, Pour un individualisme de gauche, Ed.
Lattès, Paris, 2013.
23 Michael Freeden, “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?”, Political Studies, 1998.
24 Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, Common Ground, Champaign, 2003 (1st
Ed: 1981).
25 Michael Löwy, Patrie ou planète. Nationalismes et internationalismes de Marx à nos jours Page Deux, Laus-
anne, 1997, p. 57.
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promoting emancipatory objectives, this should not allow us to support nationalism
in principle.
Furthermore, nationalistic movements very rarely claim values that sound
dangerous or harmful to individual freedoms per se. Most of them, in fact, mobilize
values and principles that sound a priori progressive. Yet, even so, they can easily
lead to the crushing of individual liberties, and sometimes to very bellicose and
bloody consequences. There are numerous examples of military aggressions that
were justified by the idea that the nation was at the forefront of a battle to promote
positive and universal ideals. For instance, the imperialistic nationalisms of the
nineteenth century justified their colonial conquests in the name of the extension of
civilization against barbarism, a project presented as entailing progress for all
mankind. The official account of colonization did not talk in terms of serving the
interests of the European elites, or those of the colonizing countries, as though they
represented a sort of class alliance against the rest of the world. Rather, colonialism
was above all supposed to enlighten the indigenous by passing on to them the values
of reason and progress26. In the twentieth century, the Vietnam War was legitimized
by the United States not only by the imperatives of the Cold War struggle against the
communist bloc, but also by the defence of the values carried by the “patria” which
were presented as universal, such as freedom and democracy. And one could easily
find similar examples in contemporary debates.
In reality, the danger inherent in nationalism lies less in the values upon which it rests
than in the postulate that identification with common values is an absolute necessity
for politics. Nationalism creates an artificial – and often mainly rhetorical – cultural
homogeneity and valorization of one particular community over others and states
that this collective must have a political outlet. This insistence on a particular collec-
tive identity facilitates the preservation of existing social dominations and the
creation of new ones by constructing the notion of “others” inside and outside the
political entity. The historic fate of most nationalist movements should reinforce this
suspicion. Even when they are apparently progressive, they have generated
numerous drifts, often contradictory of their purported ideals. For example, during
the Fordist-Keynesian period, which was quite favourable to the working and middle
classes, nationalism was a way of justifying both a disinterest in the rest of the world
and some forms of neo-colonialism. We can also take as examples the nationalist
movements of decolonization inspired by socialist ideas that went on to facilitate the
instrumentation of the newly created identity by a small elite, who established their
own hierarchies. The dictatorships put in place after independence in many African
countries, for example, were made possible not only by the support of the great
powers, but also because their nationalistic rhetoric granted them a certain basic
26 On the current legacy of colonial memories, see the very thorough book: Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Berny Sèbe and
Gabrielle Maas (Ed.), Echoes of Empire: Memory, Identity and the Legacy of Imperialism, I. B. Tauris,
London, 2014.
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legitimacy. In the 1990s, various governments founded on progressive bases and
instituting real improvements in the fight against poverty and inequality, such as left-
wing regimes in Latin America, nonetheless employed strongly nationalist rhetoric in
order both to get popular support and also to concentrate power in the ruling elite
and limit internal opposition.
Beside the fact that, in its principle and by the actions it facilitates, nationalism can
reveal itself to be contradictory to progressive and universalistic ideals, our next
argument is that it is not necessary to ensure either democracy or social justice.
15
2. NATIONALISM IS NOT NECESSARY
2.1. A latent cosmopolitan spirit
For many progressive nationalists (or euronationalists), a common identity is not
only good per se, but also necessary for the maintenance or revival of social justice
and democracy. The argument goes as follows: a sense of belonging to a community
is essential to give rise to civic mobilization, mutual trust and respect for majority
decisions, allowing the functioning of democracy27. A strong identity substratum is
also indispensable in order to ensure solidarity, which is allegedly the basis of social
justice28. More generally, a common identity is seen as the only way of creating an
interest and attachment beyond close family and community circles. It would
supposedly be necessary to pass through particular community affiliations to
develop universalist attitudes: first the most immediate surroundings, then the local
community, then the nation, and only finally the rest of humanity29. Such arguments
are present in nationalist as well as euronationalist positions30. The position often
runs in opposition to the philosophically liberal tenet according to which there is no
need to have common ethical or moral references to build a functioning society: in
this perspective, human beings can have access to the universal only after experi-
encing primary modes of socializations in the family, the local community or the
nation, purportedly necessary to foster human virtues such as solidarity, benevo-
lence, generosity or loyalty31.
This postulate – the necessity of an identity substratum to sustain democracy and
social justice – can be contested in numerous ways. First of all, it is possible to
question the idea that individuals and groups support a political and social system or
progressive principles only when they feel connected to one another by common
values. Plenty of examples attest to the capacity of individuals to give support to and
even actively defend complete strangers or people living in very remote places as
well as to social or political movements without any shared identity.
27 One of the best theorizations of this argument remains that made by David Miller in On Nationality, Oxford
University Press, Oxford 1995.
28 One of the first thinkers to use this argument was Theodor H. Marshall: “Citizenship and social class”, in T.
H. Marshall T.H. and T. Bottomore (Eds), Citizenship and social class, London, Pluto Press, London, 1992-
1950, p. 8. See also contemporary philosophers like: Paul Thibaud, “L’Europe par les nations (et réciproque-
ment)”, in Jean-Mars Ferry et Paul Thibaud, Discussions sur l’Europe, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1992, p. 61-62;
Charles Taylor, “Why Democracy Needs Patriotism”, in Martha C. Nussbaum (Ed.), For Love of Country:
Debating the Limits of Patriotism, Beacon Press, Boston, 1996, pp. 119-121.
29 Benjamin R. Barber, “Fe constitucional”, in Marta C. Nussbaum, Los limites del patriotismo (Barcelona:
Paido, 1996), p. 47; Jacques Généreux, La Grande Régression, Seuil, Paris, 2010, op. cit., p. 206-223.
30 See for instance: Jürgen Habermas, „Warum braucht Europa eine Verfassung?”, Discourse at the University
of Hamburg (Die Zeit, 27/2001, p. 6; Cécile Laborde, “From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism”, British
Journal of Political Science, 32, 2002, p. 591.
31 Jean-Claude Michéa, La double pensée: retour sur la question libérale, Flammarion, Paris, 2008, p. 229-230.
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Put differently: manifestations of a “cosmopolitan spirit” are abundant in modern
history. Let us just recall the support given by a big part of the European left to the
republican side during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 through the “international
brigades”, the resistance to the Jewish extermination during the Second World War
by people who had absolutely no obligation to risk their lives for such a cause, the
various movements supporting the revolutionary struggles in Cuba, Bolivia or Chile,
or the decolonization struggles. Illustrations of a cosmopolitan spirit can also be
found in less radical movements, and even among ordinary citizens of all political
affiliations. Whatever the normative judgment expressed about them, several forms
of militancy meeting with a generally positive response among the broader popula-
tion bear witness to this latent spirit, such as: the birth at the end of the 1990s of a
“movement for a just globalization” (or the “alter-globalization” movement), organ-
ized in world and regional “social forums” and militating for a more humane and
democratic globalization; worldwide demonstrations against economic institutions
such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank or the International Monetary
Fund; the most recent movement of the “Indignés” or the “Occupy Wall Street”
movement, explicitly global in their action and approach; or in a more moderate
perspective, the involvement of ordinary citizens in NGO’s or charities helping to
alleviate the consequences of natural disasters, wars or economic catastrophes.
2.2. Universally shared principles
These few examples demonstrate that human beings can easily commit to social or
political action without sharing the same history, language or culture.
One possible explanation lies in the universal capacity to feel empathy for other
human beings in general. Children are often taught to love their immediate circle
first, followed by their local community and nation, which are often presented as an
enlarged “family”. But young children do not build ethno-cultural categories as easily
as adults do. They feel sorrow or compassion when confronted with others’
suffering, regardless of their cultural proximity32. The limitation of the capacity to
show empathy seems less innate than socially and culturally learnt. Recent studies in
cognitive psychology confirm this cosmopolitan intuition, showing that the origin of
empathic tendencies and the faculty to adopt universalist behaviors are ingrained in
human nature, and appear at an early age in all societies33.
A whole field within socio-biology confirms this, showing that empathy and even
altruism must have deep biological roots linked to the necessities of evolution and of
the survival of the group34. This faculty of empathy towards other human beings, for
32 Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 172.
33 Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
34 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Black Swan, 2006), p 241-267.
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the simple reason that they share the same humanity, as well as the capacity to
commit oneself to causes involving people from very different cultures is confirmed
by the presence of basic universal values in most cultures. Everywhere in the world,
struggles are fought by virtue of principles that can be considered universal, even if
they are not always defined in the same terms. And indeed, the argument that
human rights are exclusively Western is most often brandished by those who trample
on these rights, rather than by their defenders. More precisely, all human beings in
all cultural settings seem able to adhere to the principle that human dignity is a
supreme value independent of cultural peculiarities. For instance, Rawls’ theory of
justice35, which informs a large part of current Western thought, articulates this by
saying that principles of justice must be shared by all particular conceptions of the
good. By the same token, the Rawlsian metaphor of “the veil of ignorance” aims to
symbolically account for the elaboration of these principles independently of
particular cultural or ethical conceptions.
This universalistic approach can be found in numerous other moral or religious
doctrines which consider that human dignity should be the end of individual and
collective activity. Thus, the Kantian principles, which recommend treating others
always as an end in themselves and never only as a means, and also to think collec-
tively by putting oneself in others’ shoes, can be found in several other doctrines36.
Thus, a similar idea can be found in the fundamental Christian doctrine that we
should take notice of our fellow beings’ common humanity rather than their
particular belongings37. Other religions also advocate the common dignity of all
human beings38. All these principles convey the idea that mere belonging to human
community suffices to justify an equal value for all humans39. Highlighting these
universal principles does not entail giving support to the particular doctrines within
which they are inscribed, and even less to the acts committed in their names – which
are often antagonistic to these official axioms. We bring to the fore these anthropo-
logical and historical arguments only to show that the same humanist and univer-
salist inspiration can be found in the world’s most dominant cultural traditions. This
also allows us to understand the cosmopolitan behaviour and aspirations that have
always been taking place everywhere and in all eras.
35 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Belknap Press, Cambridge MA, 2005 (1st Ed 1971).
36 Emmanuel Kant, Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs, Edition Hatier, Paris, 2000 (1st Ed.1785),
Version électronique:http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/kant_emmanuel/fondements_meta_moeurs/
fondem_meta_moeurs.doc, p. 40.
37 Alain Badiou highlighted this universalism within the thinking of one of the main founders of the Catholic
church, namely, Saint Paul: Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: La Fondation de L’universalisme, PUF, Paris, 1998, p.
80. This universalism appears among others in the famous sentence from Saint Paul in his speech to the
Galatians (Ga, 3/28): “there is no longer Jew or Greek, slave or free man, man or woman”.
38 Hadith 2.6.1 in the Sahîh d’Al-Bukharî (810-870), Sunna (Words of the Prophet); Jérôme Ducor, “L’amour et
la compassion dans le bouddhisme” in “En dialogue sur la voie du Bouddha”, Bulletin du Centre protestant
d’études, 46th year, No 2, 1994.
39 Carriona McKinnon, “Cosmopolitan Hope”, in Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, The Political Philosophy of
Cosmopolitanism, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 245-246.
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2.3. Interests, ideologies and mobilizations
There is, however, a problem with the typical cosmopolitan argument put forward
above: action in favour of a particular political project or system does not merely
derive from empathic or altruistic tendencies. The idea that political action should be
related to morality – itself based on altruistic orientations – is shared by most cosmo-
politans40 and nationalists alike. But if this is the case, then nationalists might have a
point: it is indeed easier to show altruistic tendencies within a smaller circle or
community. And the nation is often presented by them as an enlarged family. On the
other hand, as they often contend, it might be purely utopian to extend such inclina-
tions to the supra-national or European level.
Nonetheless, it might be worth questioning the vision of social change that is preva-
lent in these debates. Historical progress requires more than common values or a
shared identity: human beings act at the collective level out of selfish motives as
much as altruistic ones41. Preaching progressive and persuasive values is therefore as
insufficient for the purpose of implementing greater social justice and democracy as
is the communitarian insistence on a common identity. First and foremost, social
change requires interest-based mobilizations and political struggles, so as to force,
and not just convince, those who have a deep-seated interest in protecting the status
quo. Yet, if progressive institutions ensue mostly from social and political conflicts,
the argument that a just system is possible only if its members share a common
identity or common values becomes invalid.
Certainly, as advocated above, these struggles require a common ideology resting on
mobilizing principles and those should probably be universal. But within this ideolog-
ical dimension, it is necessary to give primacy to rational and cognitive aspects over
axiological or values-related ones. Indeed, as argued before, grounding political insti-
tutions on identification to national values generates several dangers for individual
freedom. Thus, if progressive principles are an essential part of any emancipatory
ideology, they should consist principally in a call to the individual interests that
compose the majority of dominated people. This does not exclude an appeal to both
negative and positive emotions. Most popular ideologies rely on anger, resentment
or indignation about current injustices as well as on the hopes and dreams for a
better, more just, future. By mobilizing individuals, a progressive ideology can
contribute to creating the necessary balance of power for establishing and
maintaining just institutions.
40 See for instance: Kwame A. Appiah, “Cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers”, Northon and
Company, 2007 or David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities, Polity Press, London, 2010. Even if
Held acknowledges the importance of general structural context on political agency, he sills insist greatly on
the moral and cultural aspects enabling cosmopolitan progress.
41 Sophie Heine, “Social Change in Progressive Thought: Analysis and Propositions», Journal of Political Ideolo-
gies, Vol 7 (3), Oct 2012; Sophie Heine Pour un individualisme de gauche, J.C. Lattès, Paris, 2013.
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The argument that historical progress results less from a shared identity or common
values than from strong mobilizations – themselves encouraged by particular ideol-
ogies articulating the interests of the majorities – forcefully belies a moral form of
cosmopolitanism as well as some of the instrumental arguments in favour of nation-
alism. Furthermore, the view that maintains that nationalism is necessary in order for
there to be a viable democratic and just polity can be invalidated by empirical and
historical analysis.
Indeed, the development of democracy in Europe and the emergence of welfare
systems based on redistribution and socialization of a part of the economy are the
product of a combination of important social and political movements and a a
context where the balance of power was relatively favourable to progressive forces.
National identity may have helped consolidate these systems, but it was rarely at
their roots.
The institutionalization of social security and public services after the Second World
War in Western Europe cannot be explained predominantly by a surge of national
solidarity from the upper-classes towards the less well-off. Such a feeling was
certainly present after the butchery that had slaughtered millions of human beings,
but it is difficult to sustain the claim that it was the determining factor explaining
these advances. They were, rather, the result of numerous social actions that began
at the end of the nineteenth century – trade unions organization, mutual assistance,
cooperatives, strikes, demonstrations, destruction of industrial tools, etc – and of the
activism of various political forces42. To these elements we must add the Cold War
context: the strengthening of the communist bloc, which had been endowed with a
clear legitimacy following its determining role in the victory against the fascist states,
and which was able to rely on many armed cells among the Western Resistance
members, exerted an indirect pressure on the elites of the West to go further in the
establishment of a more just socio-economic system. Similarly, it would be naive to
maintain that parliamentary democracy was the spontaneous consequence of
national identity, since in many countries its establishment required violent revolu-
tions and very long and intense political activism. The example of French history in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and its successive revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary jolts, perfectly illustrates the preponderance of social and
political struggles in the advent of representative democracy.
Therefore, if the philosopher Jürgen Habermas is right to state that democratic
citizenship and national identity are not conceptually and necessarily linked, he may
well be wrong when he affirms that the two concepts have a strong historical and
empirical bond, especially if this link is defined as a causal relation. For him, a
common national feeling was one of the elements facilitating the emergence of
42 Guy Vantemsche, La sécurité sociale: les origines du système belge. Le présent face à son passé, De Boeck,
1994, p. 13-14.
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democratic citizenship, and the latter has subsequently consolidated the feeling of
belonging to the same collective43. There is no doubt that this historical bond has
existed one way or another but we do have to reflect on its nature. Even if the forma-
tion of national identity and the building of democratic citizenship were parallel
processes that came together and had perhaps mutually reinforcing effects, this
does not mean that the first phenomenon was the reason for the second, since corre-
lation and causality are two different things. Similar reasoning can be outlined even
more convincingly for redistributive systems, which were often consolidated in
states where a strong national identity was already present.
An additional argument against the alleged causal relationship between these two
elements – social and democratic citizenship on the one hand and nationalism on the
other – is provided by the existence of multinational states characterized by a certain
level of democracy and social justice. In the same vein, despite a very frequent postu-
late, no empirical proof is available to back up the idea that the growing multicultur-
alism of Western states has caused the weakening of their democratic and social
institutions44. Even if this deterioration seems to be an acknowledged fact, it is more
likely to be explained by economic and political than cultural factors – among others:
the victory of neoliberal economics, the extension of global competition, European
deregulations, the fading of labour resistance – and by their impact on the balance
of power between various social and political actors.
In other words, nationalism does not seem to be a precondition for a just or
democratic system. This should move us to sketch a vision of progressive politics that
goes beyond the national framework. Democratic and social institutions and collec-
tive identity are not intrinsically bound and should be disentangled. Far from being
the natural evolution of a shared national identity, these institutions are the product
of social and political struggles. Consequently, their transposition and furthering at
another level than the national one is perfectly feasible to envisage, as long as
adequate mobilizations can be fostered to this end. As we argued before, this
requires a convincing and mobilizing ideology showing the link between politics at a
supranational level and the individual interests of a majority of citizens.
43 Jürgen Habernas, “Citoyenneté et identité nationale. Réflexions sur l’avenir de l’Europe”, in J. Lenoble and
N. Dewandre, L’Europe au soir du siècle. Identité et démocratie, Esprit, Paris, 1992, p. 22.
44 Kies G. Banting, “Le contre-exemple canadien: multiculturalisme, reconnaissance et redistribution”, in
Fossum, Magnette, Poirier, op. cit., p. 335 et p. 340.
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3. TOWARDS A PROGRESSIVE APPROACH TO 
COSMOPOLITANISM
Criticizing all forms of nationalism for being undesirable and unnecessary and
promoting a cosmopolitan stance does not reveal much about the political and social
institutions that should be supported within the philosophical framework being
advocated. As a matter of fact, cosmopolitanism – like nationalism – is compatible
with very different political projects. It is therefore necessary to clarify our particular
normative approach to cosmopolitanism. We will do so only briefly here since this is
a subject we tackle in other publications45.
First of all, the cosmopolitanism promoted here intends to avoid confusion between
desire and reality. The literature on the subject very often and problematically mixes
descriptive and prescriptive dimensions: instead of only elaborating a normative
project and using it as a yardstick to assess contemporary reality, most authors also
tend to indulge in wishful thinking. Carried away by their enthusiasm for cosmopol-
itan ideas, they often mistake any weakening of the nation for a sign of the coming
ascendency of these ideas, and fail to objectively evaluate the gap that still prevails
between their ideals and reality46. In the end, this concern touches upon the strategic
issue of how to change reality. The cosmopolitanism we advocate makes a clear
distinction between reality and the ideal for which it stands. And it contends that the
only way of changing the latter is by combining the promotion of ideas with social
and political struggles.
Besides, our cosmopolitan framework goes hand in hand with a particular ideological
and political stance. A lot of cosmopolitan writings also mix a stand on identity with
particular political projects and ideologies, but without making this connection
explicit47. On the contrary, the vision defended here clearly claims to be a progres-
sive one, and is therefore very demanding in terms of democratic and social changes.
In order to put it in place, sovereignty should not be weakened, as many cosmopol-
itan approaches demand48, but rather rescued and even strengthened. It is, indeed,
impossible to put in place a lively democracy or combat social inequalities without an
effective popular sovereignty capable of imposing stringent rules on powerful
45 Among others, see the second chapter of Heine, 2013, op. cit.
46 Held, op. cit., p. 26-27; Archibugi, op. cit.; Seyla Benhabib, Another cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), p. 171-174.
47 Held, op. cit., 2010; Daniel Archibugi, The global Commonwealth of Citizens: towards Cosmopolitan Democ-
racy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008; Jean-Marc Ferry, Europe, la voie kantienne. Essai sur
l’identité postnationale, Cerf, Paris, 2005, p. 121-124; Jürgen Habermas, La Paix perpétuelle. Bicentenaire
d’une idée kantienne, Cerf, Paris, 2000), p. 51-52; Jürgen Habermas, Après l’Etat-nation. Une nouvelle
constellation politique, Fayard, Paris, 2000; Thomas Pogge, “A cosmopolitan perspective on the global
economic order”, in Brock and Brighouse, op. cit., pp. 93-102, pp. 105-106.
48 See for example: David Held, “Principles of cosmopolitan order”, in Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, op.
cit.; p. 26-27; Kateb, op. cit., p. 921-922.
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economic actors, or even of radically transforming the economic system. Sovereignty
is indispensable to any progressive project, and must, therefore, not be renounced
in the name of cosmopolitanism. One of the flaws in intellectual and political cosmo-
politanism is actually its tendency to confuse different dimensions that should in
reality be clearly distinguished. More precisely, it seems to rely on an acritical
appraisal of the basic tenets of liberalism, seen as an undifferentiated doctrine
including not only political and philosophical aspects but also economic ones49. This
also leads cosmopolitans to be critical of sovereignty, seen as almost always linked
with nationalism and the risk of power abuse. For mainstream cosmopolitanism,
sovereignty has to be tamed in all its aspects, because if its close association with
nationalism or concentration of power, and liberalism has to be defended in all its
dimensions.
Nonetheless, the truth is that one can contemplate a strong public sovereignty going
hand in hand with a cosmopolitan philosophical framework; that is to say, exempt
from any insistence on a specific collective identity. The cosmopolitan vision
promoted here stresses primarily the necessity to ground the legitimacy of the polity
in its democratic and socially just features, and ultimately in its ability to meet the
individual interests of the citizens, rather than in a specific identity. This does not
signify that identities need to be abolished, but simply that they belong to another
sphere than the political – namely, to private life, or civil society. This is perfectly
compatible with an interpretation of political and philosophical liberalism that gives
priority to the fulfillment of effective individual freedom.
Finally, we want to avoid a further common mistake in the literature on cosmopoli-
tanism, namely, its automatic association with particular – usually global – levels at
which sovereignty should be organized50. Many pleas for cosmopolitanism consider
that all transfers of power beyond national authorities are almost necessarily a good
thing, thereby confusing the identity framework and the institutional level of the
organization of power. Yet, even if one might wish that sovereignty be organized at
a world level in order to apply the cosmopolitan requirement of universal individual
rights, it is imperative to take into account the concrete possibilities available in our
current reality. Economic regionalization is more advanced than economic globaliza-
tion, particularly in what concerns trade51. Besides, political institutions and even
political consciousness are increasingly a European reality. It is, therefore, more
realistic to elaborate political projects at the European level than worldwide. By
directly jumping on to the world stage and welcoming any transfer of sovereignty to
this level, many cosmopolitan positions run the risk of actually justifying and
bolstering existing relations of power. Indeed, global evolutions tend to privilege the
49 Yet, both in practice and in theory, these dimensions can be distinguished: See the first chapter of Sophie
Heine, Oser penser à gauche. Pour un réformisme radical, Aden, Bruxelles, 2010.
50 Held, op. cit., 2010.
51 “Intra-euro Area Trade Linkages and External Adjustments”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 2013.
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interests of big economic actors rather than those of ordinary citizens. Many inter-
national treaties and institutions tend to reduce democratic sovereignty and to give
more power to private actors by strengthening the freedoms of capital, goods and
services. The solution to this should not be, however, to discard any cosmopolitan
view and to fall back on the nation state, but instead to rescue sovereignty at the
European levels and to dissociate it from any europatriotic feelings for the reasons
already explained. Even though we do not have sufficient space to explore them
here, it is worth mentioning that such a perspective would have very concrete impli-
cations for internal as well as external European policies.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a strong criticism of nationalism.
First, we highlighted the fact that the promotion of the intrinsic value of a specific
community carries numerous dangers, particularly when it is done in connection
with political action. The symbolic construction of a purportedly homogeneous
community, and insistence on its values, which are presented as superior and as a
deep bond for the members of the community, can easily provoke the absorption of
the individual into the collective. The historical construction of an artificially harmo-
nious community glosses over the internal conflicts within society, obscuring thereby
the common interests of the dominated parts of the population and their opposition
to those of the more privileged sectors. This process also makes it easier to affirm the
cultural superiority of the community of reference compared to other entities. This
leads to the construction of “others”, who can easily be exploited, oppressed or
excluded. The internal “others” can then be so presented in populist discourses in a
fashion that diverts attention from real political and social topics towards more
identity-based issues. The “others” can also be external: the devaluing of cultural
(often national) entities on the international stage can justify oppression, wars,
conquests or non-cooperative economic strategies. To sum up, through the building
and over-valuing of a symbolic and, for the most part, artificial cultural homogeneity
nationalism permits the maintenance of existing dominations and the development
of new ones.
These potential dangers can arise even in cases of nationalisms associated with
progressive political projects. Indeed, the dangers and biases intrinsic to nationalism
lies less in the values that it officially defends than in its assertion that identification
with common values is an absolutely requisite for political action. Moreover, nation-
alism is not only problematic in its national form. To transpose this approach to the
European level would involve similar problems, even in its apparently progressive
and critical version as “constitutional patriotism”.
In all forms of nationalism, the problem lies in the postulate that a specific commu-
nity is characterized by certain positive and historically-anchored values distinct
from, and superior to, those of other communities and that these values deserve to
be protected and promoted by political institutions, both inside and outside the
community. For that reason, it is actually not very relevant to contrast anti-European
“nationalists” and pro-European “post-nationalists” – or national eurosceptics and
European federalists. Indeed, those two camps often share similar communitarian
assumptions. A more conceptually and practically fruitful opposition should be made
between communitarians, who plead for congruence between the legal community
and the moral (or cultural) community and therefore encompass both nationalists
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and euro-nationalists, and cosmopolitans, who dissociate identities from legal and
political institutions, grounding them instead in universal principles.
Having exposed the dangers of nationalism, the paper further questioned the
supposed essential role played by a common national identity in guaranteeing
democracy and social justice, thereby attacking an instrumental reason for
advocating nationalism. Many progressive communitarians consider that a deep
identity substratum is indispensable for arousing the civic mobilization, solidarity,
mutual trust and respect for majority decisions that are supposed to be the basis of
any viable democracy and welfare system.
We rebutted this position first of all by arguing that human beings can easily feel
attached and connected to others without sharing the same cultural features. This
inbuilt empathic disposition goes far beyond particular cultural differences. And
indeed, most cultural or religious traditions share certain fundamental values, such
as the requirement not to treat others as means to en end, or to put oneself in
others’ shoes, demands which contribute to a capacity to think in terms of a collec-
tive organization based on the equal value of all human beings.
The article subsequently highlighted the fact that the existence of a latent universal-
istic consciousness is not sufficient to practically implement a cosmopolitan politics.
We argued that history does not change mainly through the preaching of morally
adequate and intellectually convincing ideas. Historical progress can come about
only through social mobilizations and political struggles, so as to oblige, and not
merely to urge, the privileged groups who have no interest in such a change. This
criticism of idealistic visions of history can be used to contest the purported necessity
of an identity substratum to put in place and support progressive institutions, but
also to counteract the postulate – shared by many cosmopolitans – that altruistic
values are an indispensable condition for progressive institutions. Democracy and
redistributive social systems have historically resulted less from a common identity
or shared values than from strong mobilizations. The latter were often encouraged
by ideologies that appealed not only to the hearts and emotions but also to the inter-
ests of the dominated groups. We also argued that, once established, progressive
institutions have a chance of being supported only in so far as they allow an autono-
mous collective decision, as well as fulfillment of effective individual rights. In other
words, their legitimacy should rely on the fact that they meet citizens’ interests, and
not on a common identity or common values.
Certainly, progressive values are crucial to any emancipatory ideology, in particular
if mobilizations are to be aroused. We should therefore not give up defending
cosmopolitan ideals per se. However, these ideals should appeal to individual and
collective interests if we want to generate a more effective mobilization. Even if we
did not have the space to tackle this question in this paper, we can briefly mention
that an ideology linking cosmopolitanism with the (individual and collective) inter-
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ests of most ordinary citizens should probably give priority to the principle of
individual freedom52.
Our last section clarified our interpretation of cosmopolitanism as an alternative to
nationalism. This perspective, first of all, requires being deeply aware of the gap
existing between reality and ideals. It claims, as explained above, that the advent of
a cosmopolitan framework associated with progressive policies requires us to
combine the promotion of ideals with social and political interest-based struggles:
the main engine of social change resides less in values, ideas and identities than in
social mobilization based on individual and collective interests. This does not mean
that ideas do not matter – either in their cognitive or axiological form – but that, by
themselves, they are not able to trigger substantial change. In order to do so, they
need to be connected – in the form of political ideologies – to the perceived interests
of dominated groups.
Second, the cosmopolitanism very briefly alluded to in this paper is explicitly progres-
sive. It promotes a demanding interpretation of democratic and social progress and
is extremely critical of existing reality. It requires a strong popular sovereignty
capable of controlling and transforming the economic system in a satisfying direction
for the majority of citizens. The main objective here, central to the cosmopolitan
spirit, is the effective application of extended individual rights. At the origin of
cosmopolitanism, lies this idea that individual dignity and freedom should be of
paramount importance for both ethics and politics, regardless of particular contexts
or affiliations. Ideally, the conditions to fulfill this ideal should be realized at the
world level. But considering the current economic and political conditions, it is more
realistic for now to advance this project at the regional level – in our case, the
European one. Nonetheless, this revival of sovereignty should not be accompanied
by a European communitarian rhetoric.
This approach thus avoids another rather common pitfall in cosmopolitan positions,
namely, the confusion between a position on identity, and the level at which the
organization of power should take place. Cosmopolitanism should only define the
way in which we perceive collective identities and their relationship with politics. It
should not be associated as such with specific policies, institutions and levels of
power. If the political project combined with the cosmopolitanism espoused here is
clearly progressive and hence requires a powerful democratic and economic sover-
eignty, it is much more realistic to advocate a regional organization of this sover-
eignty. The latter should however be distinct from what we have now in the
European Union. Indeed, the current transfers of sovereignty to supranational levels
are very far from meeting the demands of a progressive form of cosmopolitanism,
namely, the full realization of broadly defined individual rights in order to guarantee
individual freedom.
52 Heine, op. cit. 2013.
